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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Trade unionists and community residents determined to save the Monongahela Valley have 
succeeded in forging an effective instrument for waging their struggle. In January 1986 the Steel Valley 
Authority was officially incorporated by the State of Pennsylvania. Its board includes representatives of 
nine municipalities, including the city of Pittsburgh. In the months since the Authority was launched, its 
power, including the power of eminent domain, has been used to pressure corporations not to abandon 
manufacturing plants in the Mon Valley region. The fight to reindustrialize the Pittsburgh area is fairly 
joined, and victory is a real possibility. 
It took nearly five years of education and patient organizing to establish the Steel Valley Authority (SVA). 
Other communities around the country, suffering similar problems of capital flight, have much to learn 
from the story of the campaign to establish the SVA. But the most important lessons are easy to tell: You 
can win community support for the idea that deindustrialization is not inevitable. You can mount a viable 
struggle to preserve your community's industrial base. 
In this article, I will describe our five-year campaign to win public support for our approach to 
reindustrialization. 
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Labor-Community Coalitions 
Reindustrialization 
From Below 
The Steel Valley Authority 
• Mike Stout 
Trade unionists and community residents determined to save the 
Monongahela Valley have succeeded in forging an effective 
instrument for waging their struggle. In January 1986 the Steel 
Valley Authority was officially incorporated by the State of 
Pennsylvania. Its board includes representatives of nine munici-
palities, including the city of Pittsburgh. In the months since the 
Authority was launched, its power, including the power of eminent 
domain, has been used to pressure corporations not to abandon 
manufacturing plants in the Mon Valley region. The fight to 
reindustrialize the Pittsburgh area is fairly joined, and victory is 
a real possibility. 
It took nearly five years of education and patient organizing to 
establish the Steel Valley Authority (SVA). Other communities 
around the country, suffering similar problems of capital flight, 
have much to learn from the story of the campaign to establish 
the SVA. But the most important lessons are easy to tell: You can 
win community support for the idea that deindustrialization is not 
inevitable. You can mount a viable struggle to preserve your 
1
 Mike Stout is grievance chair of USWA Local 1397 at USS Homestead Works, 
which was recently shut down. He is a member of the boards of the Tri-State 
Conference on Steel and of the Steel VaJJey Authority. 
20 LABOR RESEARCH REVIEW 
community's industrial base. 
In this article, I will describe our five-year campaign to win 
public support for our approach to reindustrialization. 
Why Reindustrialize? 
Our efforts are based on the belief that saving basic industry 
is essential not only to maintain a decent standard of living for 
Mon Valley residents, but also to produce the steel and other 
products necessary to upgrade roads, bridges, waterways, and 
other parts of our rapidly deteriorating national infrastructure. 
The loss of industrial jobs has a devastating domino effect which 
is undermining the entire American economy. According to a 
recent study, when you lose 1,000 manufacturing jobs, you lose 
an additional 1,000 jobs in the service economy. You put the 
following service companies out of business: 17 eating places, 13 
food stores, 11 gas stations, 6 apparel shops, 3 automobile 
dealerships, 2 hardware stores, 2 drug stores, 1 sports store, 1 
jewelry store, 17 doctors and 5 dentists, and an unknown number 
of teachers, government employees, etc. 
This process of job loss and overall economic deterioration is 
what we have been witnessing in the Mon Valley the past 10 years. 
From our experience we know that there can be no "high-tech 
society" without an industrial base. There can be no research and 
development without industries to apply the new technology. 
Nearly all the jobs that have replaced the lost industrial jobs 
in the Mon Valley are "minimum wage," mostly in the fast-food 
chains. And at $3.35 an hour, you have to work 80 hours a week 
just to make what you were getting from unemployment 
insurance. Obviously, both our purchasing power and our standard 
of living are declining in tandem—each reinforcing the other. 
But much as we believe it's essential to save basic industry, we 
know the "private sector" alone can't do the job. The American 
economy now works against continued corporate investment in 
steel and other basic industries. The strong dollar, high long-term 
interest rates, and the availability of slave-wage labor in Third 
World countries have combined to make profits in manufacturing 
lower than rates of return in other industries. We know that the 
steel companies will never revitalize the steel industry The huge 
sums necessary to modernize steel mills can only come through 
the federal government. 
On the other hand, who can imagine a steel industry run by 
the likes of Ronald Reagan Or Jimmy Carter? The mere thought 
is repulsive to most sane people. The mills must be owned and 
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controlled at the local level, with workers and communities having 
a say in the decisions that directly affect their lives. 
The Tri-State Strategy 
Back in 1981, the TH-State Conference on Steel—a coalition of 
community and union activists, church people and local government 
officials—began to formulate a plan for the creation of a Steel 
Valley Authority (SVA). Our idea was modeled on the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, but its design was significantly different in that 
the SVA would have local representatives and be regionally 
controlled. 
The SVA was designed to serve both the economic and political 
objectives of Tri-State. It has the legal authority to acquire 
abandoned but viable manufacturing facilities, raise funding for 
their purchase and renovation, sell them to new owners or operate 
the renovated plants itself. It is a mechanism that can give workers 
and communities a direct say in how capital should be invested 
in the Pittsburgh area. As I explained in Labor Research Review 
#3 (Summer 1983), an SVA with the power of eminent domain: 
opens up the door to the political arena for working people 
and their allies in the communities and churches. It allows 
them to stand squarely on center stage and become active 
participants, instead of passive bystanders. 
Legally, the Tri-State strategy was hinged on a Pennsylvania law 
enacted in 1945, The Municipal Authorities Act, which stated that 
a public authority has the power to acquire "industrial 
development projects by eminent domain, including projects to 
retain and develop existing industries." Several important court 
decisions since 1981 have reinforced this public right of 
government to forcibly buy private property and use it for the 
public good. Most notably, in 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
the State of Hawaii's acquisition of large privately owned land-
holdings and their subsequent redistribution to tenant farmers. 
With our old Pennsylvania law and with recent advances and 
legal precedents in the use of eminent domain, the stage was set 
for testing our theories in the real world of depressed Mon Valley 
communities. All that was needed was to convince local borough 
officials, with grassroots pressure, to establish the SVA. Our earlier 
efforts to use the tactic of eminent domain to save plants in this 
area (at Crucible Steel, Nabisco and Mesta Machine, described in 
LRR #3) only reached the stage of failure or success on the threat 
to use it. None of these struggles ever reached the point where 
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an authority was actually created with the power and ability to 
see it through. 
Convincing local governments to take such a radical step was 
no easy task, especially in view of the strong economic and 
political hold U.S. Steel and Mellon Bank have on the Valley. But 
we knew it was not impossible. As Professor Robert Erickson, a 
Tri-State board member, explained in a recent paper he 
co-authored: 
In the milltown municipalities, public officials are 
generally not paying positions. These small town 
politicians often have personal ties through jobs, relatives, 
friends or neighbors with unemployed steelworkers. At 
the county and state, as well as at the municipal, levels 
the politicians know that many of the voters in their 
districts are union people or unemployed. . . . Most of the 
milltowns had been economically dependent upon one 
main industrial employer. Many of the municipalities 
were close to bankruptcy; some had actually laid off the 
police and fire force, turned off street lights, and failed 
to meet payrolls. Thus, [we] may explain the potential 
support for an idea like the SVA from public officials by 
the interpersonal political networks they occupied, and 
the structural constraints on the institutions they 
represented. 
Legally, the procedure for establishing the SVA was for a 
municipality or group of municipalities to give official notice of 
intent to create the Authority, hold a public hearing at least 30 
days later, adopt a formal resolution and file articles of incor-
poration with the state. 
Once Tri-State understood the process and had laid the 
educational foundation in the milltowns, all that was left was a 
lot of hard work organizing and mobilizing to see it through. The 
battle to save the Duquesne Works of U.S. Steel provided fertile 
ground to test our theories in practice. 
The Battle to Save "Dorothy Six" 
During the first nine months of 1984, Tri-State organizers had 
little success in convincing local officials and municipalities to 
form the Authority. While several mayors, borough councilmen 
and state legislators joined with us, municipalities balked at 
actually taking the necessary steps. "Dorothy'—the last blast 
furnace at USS Duquesne Works—changed that. 
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. . . Unemployed steelworkers who winterized the Dorothy Six 
blast furnace at the Duquesne Works of U.S. Steel in December 
1984. 
The officially announced shutdown of USS Duquesne Works 
was actually made on December 29, 1983, only four days after 
Duquesne blast furnace workers were given the prestigious "Iron 
Master Award" for breaking production records. Although workers 
were shocked and angered by the announcement, the realization 
that the mill would never operate again had not sunk in, and there 
was little protest. 
But ten months later, when USS announced that it was totally 
demolishing the blast furnace (Dorothy Six) and the relatively 
modern Basic Oxygen Process (BOP) furnace, it was as though 
lightning had struck a sleeping giant. All of a sudden, the boroughs 
and workers woke up one day after being married to U.S. Steel 
for half a century to discover that the company had filed for 
divorce, packed its bags, and said, "by the way, I'm taking the 
house and furniture with me too." The announced demolition was 
the spark that lit a forest fire that was to smolder for the next 15 
months, and galvanize the necessary interest to form the Steel 
Valley Authority. 
On October 19, 1984, Tri-State organizers met with a group 
which included eight state representatives and senators, four 
Congresspersons, numerous borough officials, representatives 
from religious and academic circles, and representatives of the 
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Steelworkers' International, District and USWA Local 1256 at 
Duquesne. Out of this meeting, the "Save Dorothy Six" campaign 
developed a strategy with four objectives: 
1) to prevent the demolition of the mill by any means necessary, 
legal or otherwise; 
2) to conduct feasibility studies, paid for by the USWA and local 
governments, to determine the viability of the facility; 
3) to set up a mechanism (the SVA) to take the mill from USS 
and transfer it to new owners; and 
4) to secure the financing necessary to restart the mill and equip 
it to operate competitively 
After we had given public officials a hastily organized bus tour 
of the closed Duquesne Works, we won immediate support from 
the USWA International and the County Commissioners. The 
County, the City of Pittsburgh, the International, and Duquesne 
Light Co. pledged $150,000 for an initial feasibility study. Winning 
the support of the USWA top leadership was an important step 
in getting the participation of the Duquesne local as well as other 
unions. Likewise, without the support of the County Commis-
sioners, other political officials would have been reluctant to join 
the battle. 
With pressure coming from all levels, and with talk spreading 
of a sitdown in front of the plant gates, U.S. Steel's December 10 
demolition date was delayed, and a reprieve granted until the 
feasibility study could be completed. USS set a new demolition 
date of February 2, 1985. 
While this gave us the time to organize support for an alternative, 
it also meant that the mill had to be protected from the ravages 
of winter weather and the possibility that USS would dismantle 
it a piece at a time. 
With the cold winter months fast approaching, the huge steel 
and iron-making furnaces had to be "winterized" to prevent pipes 
and other equipment from cracking and being irreversibly 
damaged. U.S. Steel officials stated publicly they would do nothing, 
since their expressed desire was demolition. In December 1984 
former Duquesne maintenance workers, acting on their own, 
entered the mill and spent five days winterizing the furnaces— 
without pay and with their own tools and equipment, pumping 
hundreds of gallons of freon into the pipes. 
Obstructionist as ever, U.S. Steel forced the workers to put up 
a $16,000 insurance policy in the event someone was injured. The 
monies for this and the supplies were fronted by the Steelworkers 
International and repaid later through an aggressive door-to-door 
collection by the loc< 
of T-shirts, buttons aj 
She Can Work." 
As Professor Erick* 
a critical and dramat 
from physical damagi 
the skills and experti 
scale demonstration o 
or bosses planned or 
To make sure the 
Duquesne workers se 
vigil outside the plant 
At one point when it. 
was about to be remo\ 
USS was forced to sho^ 
out, and a USS vice j 
Chairman David Rode] 
no matter how small, t 
on, local union officer 
inspections and make 
On January 18, 198f 
plant gate rally in Du 
included Jesse Jackson 
of the plant shutdown 
Lynn Williams and Pil 
On January 29 the fir 
that the Duquesne fu: 
growing market existed 
they could produce. Mc 
hall in Duquesne to hea 
as talk of plant gate r. 
demolition date was ag. 
a more thorough mark 
Over the next few mc 
war activists from tie. 
conducted teaching ses. 
workers and other invol' 
officials, including Lane 
Congresspersons from oi 
press conferences in fran 
On May 18, 1985, a gia 
attended by more than 
Despite the opposition o 
included fire engines, m 
r
'w—"H^y'^y^i'yff^&y 
,. ;.^iip^ 
3BK 
;m 
':'--&.: 
: • ^ ^^^SiSiiiSiIiil ;i £1« %m K«r M 
! *, \."*ffk*±V 
3 -if ^^~ VV *'< 
JSWA Local 1256 at 
>rothy Six" campaign 
any means necessary, 
f the USWA and local 
the facility; 
ce the mill from USS 
art the mill and equip 
ly organized bus tour 
nediate support from 
Commissioners. The 
ional, and Duquesne 
ibility study. Winning 
ras an important step 
local as well as other 
the County Commis-
been reluctant to join 
d with talk spreading 
. Steel's December 10 
sve granted until the 
set a new demolition 
port for an alternative, 
:ted from the ravages 
USS would dismantle 
iching, the huge steel 
ized" to prevent pipes 
id being irreversibly 
hey would do nothing, 
•n. In December 1984 
acting on their own, 
arizing the furnaces-
equipment, pumping 
as. 
the workers to put up 
Leone was injured. The 
ed by the Steelworkers 
ggressive door-to-door 
\ 
p l a a a M & k i d ^ ^ 
The Steel Valley Authority 25 
collection by the local and Tri-State, as well as through the sale 
of T-shirts, buttons and bumperstickers reading, "Save Dorothy! 
She Can Work." 
As Professor Erickson stated in his paper, "Winterization was 
a critical and dramatic moment in the strategy to save the mill 
from physical damage and demolition. It drew specifically upon 
the skills and expertise of laid-off steelworkers. It was a small-
scale demonstration of worker self-management—no supervisors 
or bosses planned or were involved in the job." 
To make sure the winterization was not in vain, laid off 
Duquesne workers set up a trailer and began manning a 24-hour 
vigil outside the plant gates to be sure USS didn't harm the mill. 
At one point when it appeared that a viable piece of equipment 
was about to be removed, 50 workers blocked the plant entrance. 
USS was forced to show local union officers what was being taken 
out, and a USS vice president downtown was ordered by USS 
Chairman David Roderick himself to notify the union of anything, 
no matter how small, that was to leave the plant. From this point 
on, local union officers freely entered the mill to make periodic 
inspections and make sure nothing vital was being removed. 
On January 18, 1985, more than 500 people participated in a 
plant gate rally in Duquesne in zero degree weather. Speakers 
included Jesse Jackson, who declared the Mon Valley "the Selma 
of the plant shutdown movement," as well as USWA President 
Lynn Williams and Pittsburgh Mayor Richard Caliguirri. 
On January 29 the first feasibility study was released, reporting 
that the Duquesne furnaces not only were viable, but that a 
growing market existed in this country for the semi-finished steel 
they could produce. More than 800 people packed a small church 
hall in Duquesne to hear a summary of the report. Two days later, 
as talk of plant gate resistance grew stronger, the February 2 
demolition date was again extended—this time until June, when 
a more thorough marketing study could be completed. 
Over the next few months, Tri-State—assisted by veteran anti-
war activists from the Catholic Thomas Merton Cen te r -
conducted teaching sessions on nonviolent resistance for union 
workers and other involved citizens. A steady stream of high-level 
officials, including Lane Kirkland and several U.S. Senators and 
Congresspersons from outside the area, toured the Valley and held 
press conferences in front of the mill to publicly support our effort. 
On May 18, 1985, a giant parade and rally was held in Duquesne, 
attended by more than a thousand people in the pouring rain. 
Despite the opposition of Duquesne borough officials, the parade 
included fire engines, numerous public officials and high school 
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marching bands. 
On May 23, the second feasibility study was released. Confirming 
the fact that a growing market existed for semi-finished slabs, it 
identified customers (other steel companies that finish steel) that 
had been interviewed and lined up. Several days later, USS delayed 
demolition of the mill for a third time, this time indefinitely. Thus, 
the initial two phases of our strategy had been overwhelmingly 
successful. 
The Rise of the Steel Valley Authority 
The campaign to save Dorothy aroused tremendous public 
support, paving the way for achieving another crucial part of our 
strategy: formation of a Valley-wide Authority with the power of 
eminent domain. 
Ten borough councils were targeted to join and appoint represen-
tatives, many taking four or five meetings to convince sceptical 
officials to pass the initial resolutions. When it came to the second 
phase of the process, Tri-State organizers canvassed entire 
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communities, turning public hearings into mass town meetings 
with anywhere from 150 to 400 people. 
By June, nine milltowns (excluding Duquesne) had passed the 
final resolution to join the Authority; soon they had all appointed 
their three representatives—which included prominent Tri-State 
members, union officials from the USWA and the United Electrical 
Workers (UE), rank-and-file workers from other unions, community 
activists from unemployed groups, retirees, church officials and 
prominent members of the small business community. The 
predominantly working class, pro-union composition of the 
appointed directors strongly contrasts with all other authorities, 
dominated by corporate and political elites. 
Thus another crucial part of our strategy had been accomplished: 
the creation of a new political structure with the legal power to 
wrest control of plants from their present overseers. 
Financing: The Death Knell for Duquesne 
While the first three phases of our strategy seemed arduous, the 
final phase—finding the capital to buy, start up and operate the 
giant mill—proved insurmountable. 
According to the first feasibility study by Locker Associates, $200 
million would be needed. In the second half of 1985 meetings were 
underway with a City of Pittsburgh economic planner to put 
together a public-private buy-out of the mill. Based on the figures 
cited in the Locker study, the city planner felt confident this 
amount could be pieced together. It was at this critical juncture 
that Tri-State organizers strayed from our original path. 
In mid-1985, after completion of the marketing study, the 
financing or cost study was turned over to the internationally 
renowned investment banking firm of Lazard-Freres. This study 
was to define what renovations and new equipment would be 
needed to make the facilities viable, and to enumerate the exact 
costs of starting up and operating the mill for the first three years. 
From the beginning, Lazard-Freres confined its study to starting 
up Duquesne purely as a slab-producing entity, and focused on 
obtaining financing from the private sector only. The Tri-State 
Conference, on the other hand, had theorized from the earliest 
days of the campaign that the Duquesne furnaces could only be 
rescued in conjunction with various finishing facuities in the Valley 
that were being phased out, such as the plate and structural mills 
at Homestead. This kind of operation, we understood clearly, could 
only be accomplished with massive public expenditures and 
government intervention. 
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As the Lazard study dragged on and on in the latter half of 1985, 
the high tide of hope in the Valley slowly ebbed. In January 1986 
Lazard released its study, concluding that there was no hope of 
attracting the capital needed to reopen the mill, which Lazard 
estimated at $304 million. 
According to Lazard, its figure was much higher than the original 
estimate because the earlier studies had not taken into account 
the variable sizes needed in the slab market and thus the need 
for an expensive, two-strand continuous caster. At this cost, Lazard 
projected, even if the workers took a one-third pay cut and the 
mill ran at 90% capacity, the mill would lose $27 on every ton 
of steel produced. 
At a press conference on January 8, 1986, USWA and coalition 
leaders officially ended the struggle to save Dorothy Six. Our 
coalition was too local and too weak. Given the large amounts 
of capital needed and the absence of viable public funding 
alternatives, the coalition was forced to turn to sectors of finance 
capital to rescue the workers from private capital itself. While 
some will argue that we had no other choice, especially in view 
of the balance of forces at the time, nevertheless, it was the 
investment bankers that sealed the fate of Dorothy Six. 
The Fight for Brake and Switch 
Though Dorothy died, the political momentum she created made 
it possible for us to continue. 
The SVA was legally incorporated with the State of Pennsylvania 
on January 31, 1986, and held its first official meeting on February 
18. The top order of business was saving the Westinghouse 
Airbrake (WABCO) and Switch & Signal plants owned by 
American-Standard, a multinational conglomerate that was 
shutting them down and running away to the nonunion South and 
Canada. 
A coalition even broader than Duquesne's emerged, as well as 
strong Residents Committees in the towns of Wilmerding and 
Swissvale where the plants are located. With some 2,300 jobs 
endangered, the SVA and the coalition vigorously escalated their 
efforts, honing their tactics and strategy with the lessons of 
Duquesne. 
In early February, a positive "business retention study" was 
released, including a detailed analysis of the social and human 
cost of the shutdowns. Nearly a dozen plant gate rallies and vigils 
were held, with anywhere from 150 to 300 workers and community 
activists participating. An actual model for buying and operating 
the plants is being widely put 
ownership: a third public, a th 
The SVA has actually begun < 
forcibly (but legally) entering ti 
Brake plant in July in order to as 
The SVA is also in the midst of a c 
to stop further removal of vital 
these two facilities. 
The funding necessary to buy 
tens of millions as opposed to t 
for Duquesne. This is an amoui 
resources of local and state gover: 
sources. During the summer of : 
to Save Brake & Switch mour 
caravanning through the industi 
holding town meetings to prom< 
well as the fundamental thesis th 
play an active, material role i 
manufacturing base. This campai 
and lobbying effort at the state a 
election, demanding public moni< 
other viable plants being phas 
Pennsylvania had a surplus of so 
Budget, and this is the money w 
In order to squeeze funds out of 
rev up another campaign against tJ 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) as a sprin 
unknown federal law passed in 
*mylt3r'<d£^- - *•«**•**/-• r-J*»iu: L,±Z J-aJ&J 
-is"''?!** 
er half of 1985, 
1 January 1986 
/as no hope of 
which Lazard 
lan the original 
Q into account 
thus the need 
lis cost, Lazard 
ay cut and the 
7
 on every ton 
i and coalition 
othy Six. Our 
large amounts 
ublic funding 
tors of finance 
1 itself. While 
jcially in view 
ss, it was the 
ly Six. 
; created made 
: Pennsylvania 
g on February 
Westinghouse 
is owned by 
ite that was 
ion South and 
,ed, as well as 
Imerding and 
ne 2,300 jobs 
scalated their 
ie lessons of 
i study" was 
1 and human 
lies and vigils 
id community 
ind operating 
X 
i1m^^m^^,«d^^^^ 
The Steel Valley Authority 29 
the plants is being widely publicized, consisting of a tripartite 
ownership: a third public, a third private, a third ESOP. 
The SVA has actually begun eminent domain proceedings, by 
forcibly (but legally) entering the Switch plant in April and the 
Brake plant in July in order to assess the buildings and machinery. 
The SVA is also in the midst of a court battle to obtain an injunction 
to stop further removal of vital machinery and equipment from 
these two facilities. 
The funding necessary to buy and operate these plants is in the 
tens of millions as opposed to the hundreds of millions needed 
for Duquesne. This is an amount attainable with the combined 
resources of local and state governments, along with private sector 
sources. During the summer of 1986, Tri-State and the Coalition 
to Save Brake & Switch mounted a major organizing drive, 
caravanning through the industrial centers of Pennsvlvania and 
holding town meetings to promote our public-private model as 
well as the fundamental thesis that government must step in and 
play an active, material role in saving jobs and the state's 
manufacturing base. This campaign will culminate in a large rally 
and lobbying effort at the state capital in the fall, just before the 
election, demanding public monies to save Brake and Switch and 
other viable plants being phased out. In 1985 the State of 
Pennsylvania had a surplus of some $250 million in its General 
Budget, and this is the money we're going after. 
In order to squeeze funds out of the private sector, Tri-State will 
rev up another campaign against the banks, using the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) as a springboard. The CRA is a relatively 
unknown federal law passed in 1979, stating that banks and 
ifE^T AA FfflNgYLVANlA! 
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lenders have an ongoing obligation to meet the credit needs of 
low and moderate-income communities within their primary 
service areas. While the law has primarily been used by 
community groups protesting home mortgage redlining of 
residential properties in old neighborhoods, nothing prevents the 
law from being used for commercial or industrial credit needs. 
Tri-State Expands Regionally 
With the tremendous amount of favorable media attention 
focused on Mon Valley struggles the past two years, the Tri-State 
office has been flooded with calls asking about the SVA, eminent 
domain, and the worker-community-local government coalition 
concept. Not only plant shutdown and unemployed groups, but 
government officials from Michigan, New Jersey, Maryland, and 
Massachusetts have inquired. 
Realizing that hundreds of towns and areas in the tri-state region 
(Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia) were confronting the same 
problems, Tri-State convened a conference on "Regional Reindus-
trialization" in December 1985. It attracted 125 union, community 
and church activists, academics and government employees from 
eastern Ohio, West Virginia and Western Pennsylvania. 
In early 1986 we dispatched an organizer to Cleveland, where 
he is working with the local unemployed council and the USWA 
to build a Cleveland plant shutdown coalition. Similar efforts are 
underway in Columbus, the Wheeling-Steubenville area, and in 
Morgantown, West Virginia. 
At the same time, activists and academics are working on the 
other leg of our regional strategy. This consists of: 
• making an inventory and assessment of regional industries, 
plants and resources, and 
• putting together a comprehensive regional plan, the heart of 
which is revitalizing steel, coal and rail and upgrading the area's 
fast-crumbling infrastructure. 
A regional approach is critical because many of the area's 
facilities are interlinked. When one is shut down, it has an adverse 
effect on numerous others. For instance, a closed Duquesne Works 
restricts the supply of semi-finished slabs to Cyclops, Sharon and 
Armco steel companies. Similarly, the decline in river traffic 
because of the poor state of most locks and dams has meant a 
drastic decline in the demand for barges that use steel plate from 
mills such as Homestead. This has led to the closure of Dravo's 
barge-building facility and of the plate mills at Homestead. As 
various parts of the region's- industrial structure are destroyed, 
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. . .Members of the Steel Valley Authority from nine munici-
palities, at the SVA's first meeting in February 1986. 
remaining sectors become less and less viable. 
Once strong labor-community coalitions are built in a number 
of sub-regions, the basis will be laid for regional pressure on the 
federal government and for united action: real reindustrialization 
from below. 
Conclusion 
For the first time in this area a strong, community-based coalition 
is beginning to mount a serious challenge to the perogative of 
corporations and banks to make all investment decisions, shut 
down viable plants, and otherwise do with capital what they like. 
For the first time, the community and workers are demanding a 
voice in the economic future of this area. While U.S. Steel has 
buried the Duquesne furnaces, the lessons being learned will 
continue to smolder, igniting more and more fires each time they 
shut down another plant. 
The issues of deindustrialization and disinvestment have been 
taken off the back burners and put on the front pages. As the 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette editorialized, public officials have been 
"spurred into a more active and creative role in the formidable 
job of shoring up the region's shrinking base of manufacturing 
industries." 
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The popularity of using eminent domain as a viable tactic to 
save jobs is spreading. Long used against us, workers and their 
communities are discovering that we can "turn the guns around." 
Not only is a worker-community coalition attempting to use it to 
save the Brake & Switch plants, other communities here are 
checking out various uses of this weapon. This summer in Indiana, 
Pa., where a violent 7-month-long strike is being fought by 200 
workers against the McCreary Tire Co., public officials have 
threatened to use eminent domain to settle the strike, by 
transferring ownership of the plant to another buyer who is 
waiting in the wings. 
Not only did the Duquesne battle spur the creation of the Steel 
Valley Authority, it raised the painful reality that without direct 
government intervention at all levels, this country will lose much 
of its manufacturing base in the next five to ten years. And the 
only way to get any response out of "big government," state and 
federal, is through grass-roots organizing in conjunction with local 
government action. When enough small fires smolder at the local 
level, the heat will go up at the regional and national levels. 
More and more people have come to see that the shutdown of 
the steel mills and the loss of our manufacturing base is not a union 
problem or an industry problem, but an American problem. 
Without manufacturing, there is nothing to apply high tech to, 
services are drastically cut, sabres rattle, and the military budget 
becomes even more bloated as Reagan moves to defend his new 
manufacturing base overseas. Likewise, as a result of their 
involvement in the plant shutdown battles directly affecting their 
lives, a sizable number of blue-collar workers in this area are 
beginning to see the need to oppose Reagan's military adventures 
abroad. 
Perhaps the most important lesson learned in the course of these 
battles, the most bitter pill to swallow, has been the question of 
capital formation. As stated in my LRR #3 article, "getting funds 
to pay the former owner 'just compensation' for a plant (once 
eminent domain is used) will be a whole battle in itself, and 
certainly a difficult one." 
In successful fights where eminent domain has been threatened 
(at Nabisco in Pittsburgh and Morse Cutting Tool in New Bedford, 
Massachusetts), either the current owner was "persuaded" to stay 
or a third party (another private buyer) was waiting in the wings. 
In local battles such as Duquesne and Brake and Switch, where 
the current owner is not only unwilling to sell but hell bent on 
stopping the takeover, third parties have been unwilling to step 
into these adverse situations. 
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Two things can be said about this. 
First, projects where the work force is in the hundreds and that 
require only a few million dollars, can be won locally, by directing 
our fire at local and state government, as well as at private sources 
through mechanisms like the Community Reinvestment Act— 
because in fact this amount of capital is actually there. But this 
will only come about if local coalitions put together very specific 
funding mechanisms and organize region-wide or state-wide 
movements directed mainly at the public sector to force 
implementation of such plans. 
But projects that require hundreds of millions of dollars will 
only be won by mounting multi-state, regional or even national 
campaigns, which will only come about when numerous local 
plant shutdown coalitions are hooked up together in a cohesive, 
ongoing battle. 
Organizers, activists and progressive-thinking people must 
understand that the disinvestment problem will not go away, and 
the drive to lower our standard of living will continue unabated. 
The American populace must be woken up to the need to rescue 
our country's manufacturing base and the fact that reindustrial-
ization can only come successfully from below, through a strong 
grass-roots movement of the people. This has got to have the same 
character as the union movement of the 1930s, the civil rights, 
women's and anti-war movements of the 1960s and 1970s. It's got 
to be that massive, that militant and that persuasive. • 
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